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These articles come from a special issue of the CICIR’s 
journal, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi. The journal devoted an 
issue to China’s “disputes in territorial waters” (领土领
海争端, lingtu linghai zhengduan), after the research 
centre brought together more than 30 Chinese experts at 
a conference on 3 August 2012 to discuss “the problem 
of Chinese maritime borders and China’s international 
strategy”. 
The articles suggest that, by increasing maritime trade 
and modernising its navy, China has gradually created 
real naval strength. However, its maritime rise has been 
met with opposition by its neighbours and by the United 
States. Maritime territorial disputes are not an isolated 
problem. Instead, they are part of a wider security issue that 
is characterised by China’s emergence and the US’s new 
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. To secure its position, 
the articles suggest, China must develop a real maritime 
strategy and assert its rights. 
Becoming a power at sea as well as on land 
Although China lies on the edge of the Eurasian continent, 
the authors agree that it has neglected the sea in favour 
of building strength on land. It has continued this policy 
even though all the “humiliations suffered from the 
19th century onwards have come from the sea” (饱受
海洋之屈辱, baoshou haiyang zhiquru), according to 
Lin Hongyu. These humiliations were mostly brought 
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about by Chinese negligence. Lin Hongyu says the country 
had not yet developed a “maritime awareness” (海洋意识, 
haiyang yishi), so it could not competently manage its 
maritime borders. Chu Shulong points out that all China’s 
wars between 1949 and 1979 – with Korea, India, and the 
USSR – were land-based. After the fall of the USSR, China 
again prioritised resolving land-based territorial disputes. 
China has only recently started to concern itself with 
maritime issues, coming to a new realisation that it is not 
only a “continental Loess civilisation” (黄土文明, huangtu 
wenming) but also a “marine blue civilisation” (蔚蓝色文
明, weilanse wenming). Jin Canrong says that all China 
is doing is normalising its strength, developing real power 
that is based not on its history as a continental power, but 
on its geography, which makes it a dual power – that is, a 
power both on the continent and at sea. 
China has the second largest economy in the world and is the 
world’s largest trading power. But it has waited a long time 
to upgrade its power at sea. Its naval strength is nowhere 
near that of its neighbours such as Japan or India, much 
less that of the United States. Lin Hongyu says that China 
faces several major obstacles in increasing its maritime 
power. Its geography is unfavourable – where the US has 
access to three oceans, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the 
Arctic, China has no direct access to the ocean, not even to 
the Pacific. It has to contend with several ongoing territorial 
disputes. And the US, the world’s strongest military power, 
has an interest in what would otherwise be China’s maritime 
sphere of influence. Chu Shulong says that, in the face of 
this “precarious maritime situation” (海洋困境, haiyang 
kunjing), China is not actually being “aggressive” (咄咄逼
人, duoduobiren), but is in fact projecting “weakness” (软弱, 
ruanruo). Similarly, Lin criticises China for being “on the 
defensive” (防御的状态, fangyu de zhuangtai), underlining 
its inferiority in maritime affairs.
Territorial disputes and the US
China is currently involved in territorial disputes in all of its 
bordering seas. Jin Canrong says that these disputes have 
become more pressing since 2010. In that year, the South 
Korean warship Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean 
torpedo in the Yellow Sea. A collision between a Chinese 
fishing boat and the Japanese coastguard in the East China 
Sea caused friction with Japan. And tensions increased 
between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the South 
China Sea. Chu Shulong, however, says that these territorial 
disputes, which are historical and non-cyclical, are not just 
China’s problem. In fact, China is not even a key player in 
some of the regional disputes. China is in a strong position 
in the South China Sea. It is at a slight disadvantage to Japan 
in the East China Sea, but its regional position is gradually 
improving. More importantly, China’s neighbours are the 
ones who are revising their views on the situation; China, 
Chu says, is completely comfortable with the status quo. 
Some internal factors have helped to intensify China’s 
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territorial disputes. Jin Canrong talks about the 
modernisation of the Chinese navy, which has obtained 
submarines as well as the country’s first aircraft carrier, 
the Liaoning. This modernisation has finally given China 
a “blue-water navy” (远洋蓝水, yuanyang lanshui). China’s 
interest in defending its maritime borders is increased by 
the fact that 9.7 percent of the country’s GDP depends on the 
maritime economy. Liu Jianfei also says that nationalism is 
very important to the Chinese people. He thinks that they 
commonly see their government as too timid, and that 
public opinion favours a radicalisation of the country’s 
foreign policy. 
The writers believe that the US is playing a crucial role in 
the deterioration of the regional situation. Jin Canrong 
says the US cannot accept China gaining true maritime 
power. If China were to become a major naval power, it 
would challenge US hegemony over international waters 
and so would be detrimental to its national interests. The 
US already benefits 
from two key 
advantages over 
China: it has 
superior materiel 
and it maintains an 
effective system of 
regional alliances. 
To give it an added edge, the US is also trying to legitimise 
its intervention in China’s territorial disputes. Washington 
hopes to fan the flames (煽风点火, shanfeng dianhuo) by 
relying on neighbouring countries, which want to involve 
the US in order to internationalise the conflicts and balance 
Chinese power. 
Liu Jianfei says that US involvement in the dispute allows 
it to legitimise its “pivot” to Asia. This strategy is aimed 
at containing China and gaining support from China’s 
neighbours. The US is using the territorial disputes as its 
“trump card to put pressure on China” (美国打压中国的一张
牌, Meiguo daya Zhongguo de yizhangpai). At the same 
time, it officially remains in the background, manipulating 
its allies “from behind the scenes” (自己则站在幕后, ziji 
zezhan zai muhou). This stance encourages China’s 
neighbours, particularly Japan and Vietnam, to adopt 
offensive strategies that negate Chinese efforts to build a 
policy of good neighbourliness.
 
Developing a major maritime strategy 
The authors suggest several ways to reinforce Chinese 
maritime strength and promote Chinese interests in the 
various territorial disputes. Liu Jianfei thinks China must 
above all try to improve its international reputation, so as 
not to risk fuelling the “Chinese threat theory” (中国威胁论, 
Zhonguo weixie lun). Beijing must also “maintain stability” 
(维稳, weiwen) throughout the region and within China. 
Jin Canrong says the territorial disputes must be viewed 
in the regional context of Chinese emergence and the US 
return to the Asia-Pacific region. He thinks the solution lies 
in communication and coordination between China and 
the US, so as to put an end to the “mutual strategic distrust” 
(战略互疑, zhanlüe huyi) and “chronic lack of confidence” 
(互信赤字, huxin chizi). The two countries must recognise 
each other’s interests. Washington must accept a stronger 
China, along with the enhancement of China’s maritime 
power. China must build cooperation with its Asian 
neighbours. It should advance the idea of an “ocean GDP” 
(海洋GDP), which would enable some of the wealth of the 
sea to be shared with neighbouring countries, thus perhaps 
encouraging them to drop some of their demands. China 
must also develop a structured defence of its rights on the 
basis of law and of historical claims. 
Lin Hongyu thinks that competitiveness and maritime 
security are essential to China’s economic development. 
Beijing must develop true maritime awareness. He thinks 
that there is a role here both for the government and, more 
surprisingly, for civil society. Through NGOs, civil society 
should help build patriotism among the Chinese people. 
Specific projects should be created to support the disputed 
islands, and financial contributions should be solicited 
to support these projects. At a strategic level, China must 
do everything to break through the encirclement created 
by the first island chain5. By strengthening its sea power, 
and transforming itself from a “maritime nation” (海洋大
国, haiyang daguo) to a “marine superpower” (海洋强国, 
haiyang qiangguo), China would protect its influence in the 
Pacific while creating a real deterrent against other navies 
in the region. 
Referencing Sun Yat-Sen’s statement that the twentieth 
century was dominated by continental powers, Lin says 
that the 21st century belongs to the maritime powers. China 
must develop maritime strength proportionate to its 
economic power. Direct confrontation with the US is not an 
option, but China should still modernise its navy and assert 
its territorial claims. The situation is uncertain, but not 
disastrous. Liu Jianfei says that China has one significant 
advantage on its side: time. Its leverage over its neighbours 
will grow along with its economy. And it will continue to 
grow in influence as its neighbours, including the US, 
become increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy – 
which will limit their room for manoeuvre.
5   Theorised by the man responsible for modernising the Chinese navy, 
Admiral Liu Huaqing (who is praised by Liu Hongyu elsewhere in his 
article), the first chain of islands corresponds to the archipelagos that 
separate the seas bordering China from the Pacific Ocean, including Japan, 
Taiwan, and the Philippines.
All China is doing is 
normalising its strength, 
developing real power that 
is based not on its history but 
on its geography.
